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United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994)
CHRISTINA EGAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,' the United States
Supreme Court held that § 2252,2 a statute criminalizing the distribu-
tion of child pornography, required the government to prove that a
distributor had knowledge of the sexually explicit nature of the mater-
ials and the age of the performers.3 The dissent disagreed with the
majority's interpretation of the statute, arguing that the grammatical
structure of the provision precluded reading the statute to require sci-
enter.4 Without a scienter requirement, a distributor would be held
* Law Clerk for The Honorable John F. Grady, United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois; J.D. Northwestern University School of Law, 1995.
1 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994).
2 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (1988) provides:
(a) Any person who-
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce by any
means including by computers or mails, any visual depiction, if-
(A) the producing of such visual or print medium involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; or
(2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction that has been trans-
ported or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce by any means including by com-
puter or mailed or knowingly reproduces any visual depiction for distribution in
interstate or foreign commerce or through the mails, if-
(A) the producing of such visual or print medium involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; shall be punished as provided in
subsection (b) of this section.
3 X-Cifrment Video, 115 S. Ct. at 472.
4 Id. at 473-74 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
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strictly liable for distribution of child pornography regardless of his
knowledge of the contents of the materials he distributed. Justice
Scalia found that the word "knowingly" only applied to the verbs in
the statute and did not extend to the elements regarding the nature
of the materials and the age of the performers. 5 He concluded that
because the statute lacked a scienter requirement, it established a se-
vere deterrent to constitutional activities and was not narrowly tai-
lored to its purpose.6
The defendant in X-Citement Video was charged with distributing
pornographic video tapes depicting a minor engaged in sexually ex-
plicit conduct in violation of § 2252.7 He argued that the statute was
unconstitutional on its face because it did not require scienter as to
minority.8 The United States Supreme Court reversed the ruling of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreeing with the defendant, hold-
ing that § 2252 was constitutional because the word "knowingly" ex-
tended to both the sexually explicit nature of the materials and to the
age of the performers. 9
This Note argues that the majority's approach was correct. The
dissent's approach, which focuses solely on the plain meaning of the
text of the statute, was wrong. Given the fact that the most natural
grammatical reading of the statute would lead to absurd results, the
majority deferred to legislative intent and canons of construction to
discern a sensible interpretation. However, the majority's analysis was
not entirely correct. The majority assumed that the statute required
knowledge as the applicable level of scienter. It failed to evaluate al-
ternative levels of scienter. The majority should have considered reck-
lessness as an applicable scienter level. Interpreting the statute to
require recklessness, rather than knowledge, would have lessened the
prosecutorial burden, more significantly promulgating Congress' de-
sire to eradicate the distribution of child pornography, while still stay-
ing within the boundaries of First Amendment jurisprudence.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND PORNOGRAPHY
The First Amendment does not protect all forms of speech abso-
lutely. When determining the degree of protection to grant speech,
5 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 476 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7 Id. at 466.
8 Brief for Respondent at 5, United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464
(1994) (No. 93-723).
9 X-Citement Vuieo, 115 S. Ct. at 472.
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courts weigh the value of the speech itself against the harm it causes. 10
In 1942, the Court considered the constitutional rights of those in-
volved in pornography and held that obscene speech was excluded
from the protection of the First Amendment." The Court set forth
the guidelines for determining what constituted obscenity in 1973 in
Miller v. California.12 Under Miller, obscene materials are works which:
(1) "the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards" would find "taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in
sex"; (2) "portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way"; (3)
"taken as a whole do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value."' 3 Thus, non-obscene pornography retains First
Amendment protection. However, when Congress enacts statutes
prohibiting speech which approaches protected First Amendment ar-
eas, the possibility of chilling protected expression arises.14 A chilling
effect occurs when individuals refrain from exercising the constitu-
tionally protected right of speech for fear of prosecution. 15 Even
though their speech is protected by the Constitution, speakers act as if
it were illegal, unprotected speech. Therefore, the First Amendment
does not permit onerous criminal sanctions to be imposed on the ba-
sis of strict liability where doing so would seriously chill protected
speech.'
6
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENACTMENT OF § 2252
Congress passed the Protection of Children Against Sexual Ex-
ploitation Act of 197717 (the 1977 Act) as a response to the growing
national concern over child pornography. Section 2252 of the 1977
Act targeted the distributors and recipients of child pornography.'8
10 Paul Fuhrman, Note, United States v. X-Citement Vudeo: The Pariah Opinion, 47 Lov. LA
ENr. L.J. 85, 88 (1994).
11 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
12 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
13 Id. at 24.
14 Robert R. Strang, "She Was Just Seventeen.. .And the Way She Looked Was Way Beyond
[Her Yearsf: Child Pornography and Overbreadth, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1779, 1784 (1990).
15 Id.
16 Ralph Drury Martin, Wien Pornography Involves a Minor, NEw JERSEY LJ., Oct. 10,
1991, at 20.
17 Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub.L. No. 95-225,
92 Stat. 7 (1978) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2257 (1994)).
18 The original text of § 2252(a) read:
(a) Any person who-
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce or mails, for
the purpose of sale or distribution for sale, any obscene visual or print medium, if-
(A) the producing of such visual or print medium involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual or print medium depicts such conduct; or
1996] 1343
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Congress considered several bills before passing the ultimate version
of § 2252.
1. Senate Efforts to Regulate Child Pornography Distributors
The earliest version of § 2252 was initially introduced by Senator
Roth.1 9 Senator Roth believed that the initial Senate bill aimed at reg-
ulating child pornography, which was directed only at the producers
of child pornography, had a serious shortcoming because it failed to
include a strong provision against the distributors and sellers of child
pornography.20 Senator Roth stated that to eliminate abuse by produ-
cers, it was necessary for the bill to cover those who distribute and sell
the producers' work.21 Thus, he proposed an amendment-com-
monly referred to as the "Roth amendment"- covering distributors
as well.
22
A discussion between Senator Roth and Senator Percy focused on
the use of the word "knowingly" in the Roth amendment. Senator
Percy asked:
Would [the amendment as drafted] not mean that the distributor or
seller must have either, first, actual knowledge that the materials do con-
tain child pornographic depictions, or, second, circumstances must be
such that he should have had such actual knowledge, and that the mere
inadvertence or negligence would not alone been enough to render his
actions unlawful? 23
(2) knowingly receives for the purpose of sale or distribution for sale, or know-
ingly sells or distributes for sale, any obscene visual or print medium that has been
transported or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if-
(A) the producing of such visual or print medium involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual or print medium depicts such conduct; shall be punished as pro-
vided in subsection (b) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (1977).
19 S. 1011, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Senator Roth proposed adding § 2252 to
amend S. 1585, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), the principal portion of the 1977 Act.
20 123 CONG. REc. 33,047 (1977) (statement of Sen. Roth).
21 Id. at 33,048.
22 Id. at 33,047. The original text of Senator Roth's amendment provided in relevant
part:
(a) No person may-
(1) knowingly transport, ship, or mail in interstate or foreign commerce for the
purpose of sale or distribution for sale any film, photograph, negative, slide, book,
magazine, or other print or visual medium depicting a minor engaged in sexually
explicit conduct; or
(2) knowingly receive for the purpose of sale or distribution for sale, or know-
ingly sell or distribute for sale, any film, photograph, negative, slide, book, magazine,
or other print or visual medium depicting a minor engaged in sexually explicit con-
duct which has been transported, shipped, or mailed in interstate or foreign
commerce.
S. 1011, 95th Cong. lst Sess. (1977).




That is absolutely correct. This amendment, limited as it is by the
phrase 'knowingly,' insures that only those sellers and distributors who
are consciously and deliberately engaged in the marketing of child por-
nography and thereby are actively contributing to the maintenance of
this form of child abuse are subject to prosecution under this
amendment.2
4
The Roth Amendment was passed seventy-three to thirteen.25 The
Senate bill with the Roth amendment language included was passed
eighty-five to one
26
2. House Efforts to Regulate Child Pornography Distributors
In the House, the initial attempt to regulate child pornography
was H.R. 6693. Section 9 (a) of the bill was a provision aimed at attack-
ing distributors of child pornography.27 Some House members voiced
two concerns about the constitutionality of the provision.28 The first
was the lack of an obscenity requirement.2 9 However, other members
questioned whether that was a valid concern; they believed that the
amendment did not need an obscenity requirement to withstand a
constitutionality test.30
24 Id. (statement of Sen. Roth).
25 123 CONG. REc. 33,057 (1977).
26 Id. at 33,061 (1977).
27 123 CONG. Rac. 30,927 (1977). Section 9(a) provides in relevant part:
(a) Any person who-
(2) knowingly transports or ships through, or in such manner to affect, interstate
commerce or foreign commerce or knowingly mails any photograph, printed matter
containing such photograph, film, or electronic visual image depicting a child engag-
ing in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such an act, for the purpose of
sale or resale;
(3) knowingly receives for the purpose of selling or knowingly sells any photo-
graph, printed matter containing such photograph, film, or electronic visual image
which has been shipped or transported through, or in such manner as to affect, inter-
state commerce or foreign commerce or has been mailed and which depicts a child
engaging in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such an act[.]
H.R. 6693, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(a) (1977).
28 See id. at 30,932-36.
29 See 123 CONG. REC. 30,932-34 (1977) (statement of Rep. Conyers). Rep. Conyers
stated that, by enacting the amendment without an obscenity requirement: "We are going
to be furnishing an obvious out to any lawyer who has read the string of decisions on
obscenity and child pornography. He will be able to allude specifically to the legislative
history knowing we have stated time and time again that obscenity cannot be defined by
statute and unless that test is made in that or other court cases, we are not going to be able
to get around it." Id. at 30,934.
30 See id at 30,934-36 (statements of Rep. Ashbrook, Rep. Jeffords, Rep. Murphy, and
Rep. Brademas). Rep.Jeffords stated that the lack of an obscenity requirement in the bill
did not pose a constitutional problem: "[W]e are not talking about obscenity. This is im-
portant. We are talking about the abuse of children.... That raises different questions,
standards which have not been tested regarding constitutional questions, standards which
give us an opportunity in this area to make the law more specific and to take care of
1996] 1345
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The second concern involved the word "knowingly" as used in
§ 9(a).31 House members supporting the amendment, however, clari-
fied that the bill was intended to prosecute only those distributors and
sellers who know that the material they are transporting is child por-
nography.32 The House passed the bill by a vote of 375 to 12.33
Later, the House considered a version of the bill passed by the
Senate, but without the language of the Roth amendment covering
distributors of child pornography. 34 Some House members argued
for a motion to include the language of the Roth amendment, observ-
ing that without the Roth language, the bill accomplished little.35
Other House members argued strongly against that motion because
the Roth amendment lacked an obscenity requirement, noting that
the Department of Justice opposed the language of the Roth amend-
ment for that reason on constitutional grounds.36 Despite the contro-
versy, the motion to include the Roth amendment language passed by
a vote of 358 to 54.37
problems which might not be possible under the more general law with respect to pornog-
raphy. This bill is another standard for controlling abusive child labor, a sound constitu-
tional base." Id. at 30, 934. See also id. at 35,031 (statement of Rep. Ashbrook).
31 Id. at 30,935-36 (statement of Rep. Jeffords).
32 See id. at 30,935-36 (statements of Rep. Jeffords, Rep. Murphy, and Rep. Brademas).
Rep.Jeffords stated: "It is true that regarding the problem of transportation the definition
ought to be clear. We are talking about people knowing that it is the kind of stuff we are
talking about, not knowing they are just transporting a piece of material. It is intended
that they have knowledge of the type of material being transported, that it contains the
type of material proscribed by the bill." Id. at 30, 935. Rep. Murphy stated: "This bill is
specifically directed to anyone who is the cause of or participates in, dealer or processor of
such materials which depict the sexual abuse of a child and which thereby contributes to
the destruction of that child's life." Id. Rep. Brademas stated: "Not only did we carefully
determine who would be affected by this legislation, we also made quite certain to protect
those who should not be subject to its provisions. The bill quite clearly focuses on the
pornographers and protects, for example, the truck driver who has no knowledge or con-
trol over the magazines he delivers." Id. at 30,936.
33 Id. at 30,938-39.
34 Id. at 35,030 (statement of Rep. Ashbrook). The bill was H.R. 8059, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977).
35 Id. at 35,033 (statements of Rep.Jeffords and Rep. Ashbrook). Rep. Ashbrook (who
introduced the amendment to H.R. 6693 dealing with the distribution and sale of child
pornography) objected to the House version of S. 1585 because it did not include the Roth
amendment. Id. at 35,031. Rep. Ashbrook stated that he believed the Supreme Court
would uphold the Roth language "particularly in light of the fact that distributors and
purveyors of child pornography, of child sexual movies, are a source of greed and profit."
Id. at 35,033. Rep. Jeffords stated that the Roth amendment was crucial in order to "shut
off the market," noting that if producers could not sell the material, they would not pro-
duce it. Id. at 35,033.
36 Id. at 35,031-32 (statement of Rep. Conyers).
37 Id. at 35,033.
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3. Legal Debate Surrounding the Proposed Legislation Regulating Child
Pornography Distributors
Several government bodies considered the proposed Senate and
House bills regulating child pornography. In particular, these govern-
ment bodies addressed two issues regarding the provisions pertaining
to distributors: (1) the lack of an obscenity requirement and (2) the
use of "knowingly."
a. Lack of an obscenity requirement
In reviewing provisions covering distributors of child pornogra-
phy, the Department of Justice stated that the material targeted by
laws aimed at producers and distributors would have to meet the ob-
scenity test so that non-obscene materials protected by the First
Amendment would remain unregulated.38
Considering the lack of an obscenity requirement, the Commit-
tee on the Judiciary for the Senate distinguished between the treat-
ment of producers and distributors, stating that it could not extend
federal law to make illegal the sale and distribution of materials whose
production involved the use of minors in sexually explicit conduct be-
cause of First Amendment considerations.3 9 Thus, it proposed merely
amending existing obscenity laws to provide for more severe penalties
for the sale and distribution of obscene materials depicting children
in sexually explicit conduct.40
38 Sexual Exploitation of Children: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1977) (statement of John
Keeney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department ofJustice). "It would have to
be found that the film, the photograph, the magazine appealed to prurient interest and
otherwise met the tests of Miller, which would require that it really have no social, artistic,
scientific, or politically redeeming features." Id. at 309-10.
See also S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-27 (1977) (letter from Assistant Attor-
ney General Patricia M. Wald to Chairman for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
James 0. Eastland considering S. 1011, stating: "In the face of the strong constitutional
protection accorded material which is not obscene, we cannot say with certainty that the
proposed legislation would withstand constitutional scrutiny").
See also Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to
Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 85
(1977) (statement of Donald Nicholson, Staff Attorney, Criminal Division, Department of
Justice) (noting the clash of interests exemplified by Supreme Court decisions striking
down statutes that deal with material that is not obscene and decisions of the Court recog-
nizing the interest in protecting the welfare of children). Peter Flaherty, Deputy Attorney
General, U.S. Department ofJustice, stated: "If the bill was clearly limited in its coverage
to the use of children in producing materials which were themselves obscene, there would
be no problem at all as far as we see it." Id.
39 S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1977).
40 Id. See id. at 20-21 (proposing amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (prohibiting the mail-
ing of obscene or crime-inciting matter), 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (prohibiting the importation or
interstate transportation of obscene matters), and 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (prohibiting the inter-
19961 1347
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b. Use of "knowingly"
The Department ofJustice considered the use of the word "know-
ingly" in both the provision covering producers of child pornography
and the provision covering distributors. It recommended that "know-
ingly" be stricken from the provision governing producers in order to
prevent an interpretation that the government must prove that the
defendant knew the child was a minor. The Department stated that
the term "knowingly" was appropriate in the section covering distribu-
tors "to make it clear that the bill does not apply to common carriers
or other innocent transporters who have no knowledge of the nature
or character of the material involved."41 However, the Department of
Justice advised: "To clarify the situation, the legislative history might
reflect that the defendant's knowledge of the age of the child is not an
element of the offense but that the bill is not intended to apply to
innocent transportation with no knowledge of the nature or character
of the material involved."
42
The Committee on the Judiciary for the Senate also considered
the use of the word "knowingly" in provisions governing producers
and distributors of child pornography.43 The Committee stated that
by including the word it intended to "require that the person charged
under these provisions have knowledge or reason to know the pur-
pose for which the minor was being used in the production of the
material in question."
4 4
Taking the opposite position, the Committee on the Judiciary for
state transportation of obscene matters for sale or distribution)).
41 H.R REP. No. 696, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1977) (statement ofJohn Keeney, Dep-
uty Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, considering H.R. 8059 §§ 8, 9(a) (1)). See
also S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Ses. 24, 28 (1977) (letter from Assistant Attorney
General Patricia M. Wald to Chairman for the Senate Committee on theJudiciaryjames 0.
Eastland, considering S. 1011 §§ 2251, 2252(a)(1)).
42 See id.
43 S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1977) (considering S. 1585 as passed with
the Roth amendment). The Committee offered an amendment of S. 1585 in the nature of
a substitute and recommend that the bill, as amended, pass. Id. at 1. The only constitu-
tional concerns noted by the Committee involved vague definitions and the lack of an
obscenity requirement. Id. at 11-12.
44 Id. at 15. S.1011 § 2251, covering producers of child pornography provides, in rele-
vant part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to employ, use, persuade, induce, entice,
or coerce any minor to engage in, or to have a minor assist any other person to engage in,
any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of promoting any film, photography, nega-
tive, slide, book, magazine, or other print or visual medium, if such person knows or has
reason to know that such film, photograph, negative, slide, book, magazine, or other print
or visual medium will be mailed or otherwise transported in interstate or foreign
commerce.
See id. at 2.
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the House of Representatives addressed the removal of the word
"knowingly" from that provision. The committee report explained:
"The bill is no longer subject to an interpretation requiring the Gov-
ernment to prove the defendant's knowledge of everything that fol-
lows the word 'knowingly', including the age of the child.... It is not
the intention of the committee to require the Government to prove
the defendant knew the child was under age 16."45
4. Conference Committee Resolution on Legislation Regulating Child
Pornography Distributors
Despite the passage of bills containing the language of the Roth
amendment in both the Senate and the House, the version of the pro-
vision covering distributors that emerged from the Conference Com-
mittee altered the language of the Roth amendment in two ways.46
First, the final version included an obscenity requirement. 47 Second,
the requirement that the material involve "a minor engaging in sexu-
ally explicit conduct" was broken off into a separate subclause intro-
duced by the word "if' in the final version, unlike the Roth version
which included that requirement in the same paragraph with "trans-
port" or "ship." The legislative history does not reflect any discussion
among members of Congress regarding this change. It is clear, how-
ever, that members of Congress, reviewing the final version of § 2252,
45 H.R. REP. No. 696, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977).
46 The adopted version of § 2252(a) provides:
(a) Any person who-
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce or mails, for the
purpose of sale or distribution for sale, any obscene visual or print medium, if-
(A) the producing of such visual or print medium involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual or print medium depicts such conduct; or
(2) knowingly receives for the purpose of sale or distribution for sale, or knowingly
sells or distributes for sale, any obscene visual or print medium that has been trans-
ported or shipped in interstate commerce or foreign commerce or mailed, if-
(A) the producing of such visual or print medium involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual or print medium depicts such conduct; shall be punished as pro-
vided in subsection (b) of this section.
See H.R. REP. No. 811, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977); S. REP. No. 601, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
2 (1977).
47 See 123 CoNG. REc. 37,135 (1977) (statements of Sen. Mathias and Sen. Roth). Sena-
tor Mathias supported the inclusion of the obscenity requirement: "The modification, in-
corporating the Supreme Court test for obscenity as laid down in Miller v. COlifornia, 413
U.S. 445 (1973), guarantees in my opinion the constitutionality of the legislation." Id.
Senator Roth, however, expressed his disappointment that the conferees had "chosen to
weaken" the amendment by inserting the obscenity requirement and questioned the ability
of the conference to make such a change in view of the 73 to 13 vote in the Senate passing
the amendment and an instruction in the House by a vote of 358 to 54 to adopt the Roth
amendment. Id. at 37,135-36.
1996] 1349
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
regarded the inclusion of the obscenity requirement as the only signif-
icant change from the Roth amendment language.4s
The Conference Report from the Committee of Conference gave
little explanation for the changes.49 The Committee accepted the
House version of the provision covering producers which did not con-
tain an express requirement that the crime be committed "know-
ingly"; it accepted this provision "with the intent that it is not a
necessary element of a prosecution that the defendant knew the ac-
tual age of the child."50
The Committee adopted the Senate version of the provision cov-
ering distributors, which modified the provision to require that the
visual depiction be obscene. 51 The Committee did not directly ad-
dress the issue of the use of the word "knowingly" in that section, stat-
ing only that:
It is the intent of the conference committee that if a minor has engaged
in this sexually explicit conduct and there was a production of material
using any printed or visual medium depicting such conduct that persons
who knowingly transport, ship, or mail for the purpose of sale or distri-
bution, or knowingly thereafter receive for sale or distribution, or know-
ingly thereafter sell or distribute for sale any such material are liable
whether or not they have contact with the minor or the original produc-
tion of the material. 52
48 124 CONG. REc. 526-28 (1978) (statements of Rep. Conyers and Rep. Ashbrook).
Rep. Ashbrook stated: "The Roth language which came before the Congress was not ac-
cepted specifically as it was adopted in the Senate. It was modified then to include the
word 'obscene.' I believe this does reduce some of the value and strength of the Roth
amendment. I think, in all fairness, we have about 90 percent of the Roth amendment."
Id. at 527-28. Rep. Conyers stated that the new sections added to Title 18 would "go after
the distributors and transporters.... That we do by adding the language of the so-called
Roth amendment with an obscenity standard which has been established by a line of
Supreme Court decisions." Id. at 527.
49 See H.R. REP. No. 811, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7 (1977); S. REP. No. 601, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 5-7 (1977) [hereinafter Conference Reports].
50 Conference Reports, supra note 49, at 5. The adopted version of § 2251 provided
that:
(a) Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor
to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, any sexually
explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual or print medium depicting
such conduct, shall be punished as provided in subsection (c), if such person knows or
has reason to know that such visual or print medium will be transported in interstate
or foreign commerce or mailed, or if such visual or print medium has actually been
transported in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed.
See Conference Reports at 1-2.
51 Conference Reports, supra note 49, at 6-7.
52 Conference Reports, supra note 49, at 7.
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C. NEW YORK V. FERRER AND THE ELIMINATION OF THE OBSCENITY
REQUIREMENT
In 1982, the Supreme Court decided New York v. Ferber.53 In Fer-
ber, the Court held that a New York statute prohibiting persons from
knowingly promoting a sexual performance by a child under the age
of sixteen by distributing material depicting such a performance did
not violate the First Amendment.54 The statute prohibited distribu-
tion of materials that did not qualify as obscene-materials previously
considered within the scope of First Amendment protection.5 5 In
holding the statute constitutional, the Court recognized child pornog-
raphy as a category of material outside the protection of the First
Amendment.56 It reasoned that because child pornography "bears so
heavily and so pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its
production, we think the balance of competing interests is clearly
struck and that it is permissible to consider these material as without
the protection of the First Amendment."57 However, the Court cau-
tioned: "as with obscenity laws, criminal responsibility may not be im-
posed without some element of scienter on the part of the
defendant."5 8
As a result of the Ferber decision, Congress eliminated the obscen-
ity requirement when it amended the 1977 Act in 1984 (the 1984
Act).59 Congress recognized that an obscenity requirement could
53 485 U.S. 747 (1982).
54 Id at 750.
55 Id.
56 See id. at 756-64.
57 Id. at 764. In reaching its conclusion, the Court considered the following. (1) a
state's interest in protecting the well-being of children is clearly "compelling"; (2) the dis-
tribution of photographs and films depicting children engaged in sexual activity is intrinsi-
cally related to the sexual abuse of children; (3) the advertising and selling of child
pornography provide an economic motive for and are thus an integral part of the produc-
tion of such materials; (4) the value of permitting live performances and photographic
reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de
minimis; (5) recognizing and classifying child pornography as a category of material
outside the protection of the First Amendment is not incompatible with earlier decisions.
Id. at 756-64.
However, the Court limited the category of child pornography, noting that "the distri-
bution of descriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene, which
do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of live per-
formances, retains First Amendment protection." Id. at 764-65.
58 Id. at 765 (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) and Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974)).
59 S. REP. No. 169, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 6-7 (1983); H.R. REP. No. 536, 98th Cong. 1st
Sess. 1-2 (1983). See Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2256 (1984).
Congress did not change the placement of the word "knowingly" in § 2252, and the issue
of scienter as to either the age of the minor or to the nature of the materials was not raised.
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serve as an impediment to conviction and therefore removed the ob-
scenity requirement to maximize the protection of federal law to
minors.6
0
D. CONSIDERATION OF "KNOWINGLY" IN THE 1986 AMENDMENTS
The Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986 (the 1986
Act) added a provision to the text of the 1977 Act banning the pro-
duction and use of advertisements for child pornography.6' That sec-
tion rendered illegal the conduct of any individual who "knowingly
makes, prints, or publishes" an advertisement offering to receive any
visual depiction involving the use of a minor engaged in sexually ex-
plicit conduct.62 Congress explained its intention in using the word
"knowingly": the "government must prove that the defendant knew
the character of the visual depictions as depicting a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct, but need not prove that the defendant actu-
60 S. REP. No. 169 at 7; H.R. REP. No. 536 at 1. The other significant change in § 2252
was the elimination of the commercial purpose requirement. S. REP. No. 169 at 6; H.R.
REP. No. 536 at 1. As amended by the 1984 Act, § 2252(a) provided:
(a) Any person who-
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce or mails, for
the purpose of sale or distribution for sale, any visual or print medium, if-
(A) the producing of such visual or print medium involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual or print medium depicts such conduct; or such visual or print
medium is obscene and depicts such conduct; or
(2) knowingly receives, sells or distributes any visual or print medium that has
been transported or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if-
(A) the producing of such visual or print medium involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual or print medium depicts such conduct or such visual or print
medium is obscene and depicts such conduct; shall be punished as provided in subsec-
tion (b) of this section.
61 Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628, 100 Stat. 3510
(1986). See H.R. REP. No. 910, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1986).
62 Id. The 1986 Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 2251 in relevant part by inserting subsection
(c) which provides:
(1) Any person who, in a circumstance described in paragraph (2), knowingly makes,
prints, or publishes, or causes to be made. printed or published, any notice or adver-
tisement seeking or offering-
(A) to receive, exchange, buy, produce, display, distribute, or reproduce, any vis-
ual depiction, if the production of such depiction involves the use of a minor engaged
in sexually explicit conduct and such visual depiction is of such conduct; or
(B) participation in any act of sexually explicit by or with any minor for the pur-
pose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct; shall be punished as provided
under subsection (d).
(2) The circumstance referred to in paragraph (1) is that-
(A) such person knows or has reason to know that such notice or advertisement
will be transported in interstate commerce or mailed; or





ally knew the person depicted was in fact under 18 years of age or that
the depictions violated Federal law."
63
E. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INTERPRETING SCIENTER REQUIREMENTS
IN REGULATING PORNOGRAPHY DISTRIBUTION
The Supreme Court considered the level of scienter required for
laws regulating pornography distributors in three major decisions
prior to X-Citement Video. In Smith v. California, the Court held that
obscenity laws must contain a scienter requirement. 64 The Court in-
validated a California obscenity statute that imposed strict liability on
distributors of obscene material stating: "[T]he constitutional guaran-
tees of the freedom of speech and of the press stand in the way of
imposing a [strict liability] requirement on the bookseller."65 The
Court did not define, however, what degree of scienter was required.66
In Hamling v. United States the Court evaluated the scienter re-
quirement in a federal statute criminalizing the mailing of obscene
materials. 67 The Court held that the government was not required to
prove that the defendant had knowledge of the legal status of the
materials involved, so long as the defendant had some knowledge of
their contents. "It is constitutionally sufficient that the prosecution
show that the defendant had knowledge of the contents of the materi-
als he distributed, and that he knew the character and nature of the
materials."6
8
While Smith and 'Hamling discussed scienter with respect to por-
nography, illegal because it was obscene, in Osborne v. Ohio the Court
examined what level of scienter was required for a law regulating child
pornography, illegal because it depicted minors.69 The Court re-
viewed an Ohio state statute criminalizing the possession of child por-
nography that had no scienter requirement.70 An Ohio default
statute provided that recklessness was the appropriate mens rea where a
statute does not specify culpability or indicate a purpose to impose
strict liability.7' The Court concluded that, although on its face the
statute lacked a mens rea requirement, "that omission brings into play
63 Id. at 6.
64 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
65 Id. at 152-53.
66 Id.
67 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
68 Id. at 123. The Ninth Circuit, in Ripplinger v. Collins, interpreted Hamlingas requir-
ing a distributor of obscene materials know only the character of the materials distributed
and not the specific content. Ripplinger v. Collins, 868 F.2d 1043, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 1989).
69 495 U.S. 108 (1990).
70 Id. at 106 (citing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.323(A) (3) (Supp. 1989)).
71 Id. at 114 n.9 (citing Ohio Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2901.21(B) (1987)).
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and is cured by [the default statute] that plainly satisfies the require-
ment laid down in Ferber that prohibitions on child pornography in-
clude some element of scienter. "72
F. NINTH CIRCUIT AND OTHER LOWER COURT DECISIONS INTERPRETING
§ 2252
Decisions evaluating whether § 2252 requires scienter in the
Ninth Circuit and other lower courts have varied. The Ninth Circuit
in United States v. Moncini found that under § 2252, a defendant
needed to have knowledge regarding the nature of the contents
mailed to be liable. 73 Other lower courts have also found § 2252 con-
tains a scienter requirement.74 However, a later Ninth Circuit deci-
sion rejected the notion that § 2252 contained a scienter requirement
as to the age of the minor and, without addressing the constitutional-
72 Id. at 115.
73 882 F.2d 401, 404 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting defendant's claim that § 2252 required
the government prove that he knew the material he mailed was actually illegal).
74 See, e.g., United States v. Knox, 977 F.2d 815, 825 (3d Cir. 1992) (defendant must be
aware of the general nature and character of the materials but need not know they are
illegal), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 375 (1993); United States v. Osborne, 935 F.2d
32, 34 n.2 (4th Cir. 1991) (common sense meaning of 'knowing receipt' is that the defend-
ant know he ordered child pornography); United States v. Brown, 862 F.2d 1033, 1036 (3d
Cir. 1988) (holding that a recipient must know that the materials received are child por-
nography); United States v. Marchant, 803 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1986) (government must
prove defendant knowingly received child pornography); United States v. Duncan, 896
F.2d 271, 278 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that titles of videos ordered were enough evidence
for jury to conclude that defendant knew videos depicted children engaged in sexually
explicit acts); United States v. Garot, 801 F.2d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 1986) (finding certain
exhibits relevant for proof of scienter under § 2252); United States v. Maday, No. CR-88-
145E, 1989 WL 53023, *3 (W.D.N.Y. May 18, 1989) (reading in knowledge requirement);
United States v. Sherin, No. 86-CR-480, 1987 WL 6146, * 7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 1987) (gov-
ernment must prove distributors knew underage status of performers).
Several courts of appeals considered and rejected the Ninth Circuit's decision in X-
Citement Video holding that § 2252 did not contain a scienter requirement. Brief for Peti-
tioner at 12, United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct 464 (1994) (No. 93-723).
See, e.g., United States v. Brurian, 19 F.3d 188, 191 (5th Cir. 1994) (interpreting the statute
to require actual knowledge or reckless disregard of a performers minority); United States
v. Colavito, 19 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1994) (provision can be fairly read to require that
defendant know he is receiving items that depict child pornography);*United States v. Gen-
dron, 18 F.3d 955, 957 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that "knowingly" modifies not only the word
"receives" but also the statute's description of the received material's pornographic con-
tent); United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 472 (1st Cir. 1994) (reading "knowingly" to
modify not only the word "receives" but also the entire paragraph including age and con-
duct and finding that "knowingly" can refer to recklessness rather than actual knowledge);
United States v. Cochran, 17 F.3d 56, 60 (3d Cir. 1994) (provision requires knowledge that
one or more of the performers is underage).
Several district courts also rejected the Ninth Circuit's holding in X-Citement Vueo. See,
e.g., United States v. Edwards, No. 92-CR-884, 1993 WL 453461 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 1993);
United States v. Long, 831 F. Supp. 582 (W.D. Ky. 1993); United States v. Kempton, 826 F.
Supp. 386 (D. Kan. 1993); United States v. Prytz, 822 F. Supp. 311 (D.S.C. 1993).
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ity of the statute, found that the statute only required that the defend-
ant knowingly transported and received the material.75 Other-lower
courts have also ignored constitutional issues and interpreted § 2252
as a strict liability statute.
76
G. SCIENTER AND CRIMINAL OFFENSES
Criminal offenses generally must contain a scienter requirement;
intent is almost always an indispensable element in a criminal stat-
ute.77 The Court disfavors strict liability offenses.78 Even where a stat-
ute does not specify a mens rea component, the rule of lenity7 9 directs
courts to read a state of mind element into the offense.80 The Court
has explained: "Although the rule of lenity is not to be applied where
to do so would conflict with the implied or expressed intent of Con-
gress, it provides a time-honored interpretive guideline when the con-
gressional purpose is unclear."81
75 United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1069-70 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 826
(1990). Another Ninth Circuit opinion, United States v. United States District Court for
the Central District of California, addressed § 2251, the provision governing liability of
producers of child pornography. 858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988). Judge Kozinski, writing for
the majority, concluded that, under Smith v. California, the section may not make defend-
ants strictly liable because it restricts speech. Id. at 358-41. To save the statute from being
found unconstitutional, he engrafted an affirmative mistake of age defense onto § 2251.
Id. at 540-43. The opinion did not address § 2252 directly but did distinguish between
producers and distributors stating that because distributors are not in a position to learn
the ages of the individuals involved, a higher degree of scienter would be necessary to find
them liable. Id. at 544.
76 See, e.g., United States v. Kleiner, 663 F. Supp. 43, 44 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (concluding
that a shipper of child pornography need not know age of performers to be held liable
although not specifically considering constitutional issues); United States v. Reedy, 632 F.
Supp. 1415, 1423 (W.D. Okla. 1986) (in reviewing a § 2251 conviction, found the provision
to contain no constitutional requirement regarding knowledge of performers age), aff'd,
845 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1055 (1989); United States v. Tolczeki,
614 F. Supp. 1424, 1429 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (upholding § 2252 against a constitutional chal-
lenge despite finding that it contains no scienter requirement).
77 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978). A general rule
of American criminal law is that every crime must include a mens rea and an actus reus-the
.concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand." Fuhrman, supra note 10,
at 97 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952)).
78 United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 437-38. However, in limited circumstances, Con-
gress has created and the Court has recognized strict liability offenses. Id. at 437.
79 This is the common law tradition that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal
statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity." United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 437
(quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
80 Id. Where intent is absent from the statute, "Congress will be presumed to have legis-
lated against the background of our traditional legal concepts which render intent a criti-
cal factor, and 'absence of contrary direction [will] be taken as satisfaction with widely
accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.'" Id. (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at
263).
81 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) (holding that, despite the ab-
sence of a mens rea requirement in the relevant statute, the Government must prove that
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However, public welfare offenses are the exception to the general
rule requiring scienter. These offenses dispense with the conven-
tional mens rea requirement for criminal conduct.82 Cases recognizing
such offenses typically involve conduct that a reasonable person
should know is subject to stringent public regulation and may seri-
ously threaten community health or safety and involve statutes that
regulate potentially harmful or injurious items.83 The Court relies
"on the nature of the statute and the particular character of the items
regulated to determine whether congressional silence concerning the
mental element of the offense should be interpreted as dispensing
with conventional mens rea requirements."
84
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In June of 1986, Los Angeles Police Officer Steven Takeshita and
FBI Special Agent Nellie Magdaloyo, posing as pornography distribu-
tors, met with defendant-petitioner Rubin Gottesman at the business
premises of X-Citement Video, which Gottesman owned.8 5 Officer
Takeshita purported to own a video store in Hawaii that Agent
Magdaloyo supposedly managed.86 At the meeting, Gottesman
agreed to ship videotapes showing adults engaging in sexually explicit
conduct to the store in Hawaii. 87 Officer Takeshita returned to X-
Citement Video the following month and again spoke with Gottes-
man.88 Gottesman mentioned that he was keeping some tapes at his
residence because of the Traci Lords investigation. 89
defendant had knowledge that his conduct was performed in a manner unauthorized by
statute, although the Government need not show that the defendant had any knowledge of
specific regulations governing the conduct).
82 Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1797 (1994). In Staples, the Court deter-
mined that a statute regulating possession of an automatic rifle was not a public welfare
offense, holding that the government was required to prove that the defendant knew of
the automatic firing features that brought it within the scope of the regulatory require-
ment. Id. at 1804.
83 Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433. In those situations, as long as the defendant knows that he
is dealing with a dangerous item, he should be alerted to the probability of strict regula-
tion, and it is his burden to determine whether his conduct is crossing the boundaries of
the law. Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1798.
84 Staples, 114 S. CL at 1798. See generally Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252-60.





89 Id. Traci Lords first professional appearance was in the September 1984 issue of
Penthouse magazine when she was sixteen. Brief for Respondent at 4, United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994) (No. 93-723). She was considered one of the
top adult film actresses in the country and made about 75 sexually explicit movies and
videos before she was eighteen years old. Id. Lords provided prospective employers with a
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Officer Takeshita returned six months later to purchase addi-
tional videotapes. 90 He stated that he wanted tapes that Traci Lords
had made when she was under the age of eighteen. 91 He was shown
forty-nine tapes featuring Lords, two of which were identified as her
earliest films. 9 2 Gottesman said that he would accept only cash for the
tapes because he did not want to create any record of the transac-
tions.93 He declined to ship the tapes to Hawaii because he was under
federal investigation. 94 Takeshita returned to pick up the tapes the
next day; Gottesman warned him that anyone willing to pay over $50
for the tapes was probably a police officer and advised him that it was
probably safe to sell the tapes in Hawaii because the government did
not prosecute the sale of child pornography there.95
Officer Takeshita returned to X-Citement Video on February 13,
1987.96 Gottesman informed him that he had fifty-six additional
Lords tapes available.97 Takeshita asked Gottesman to ship the tapes
to Hawaii. 98 Although initially Gottesman declined the request-not-
ing that because Lords was a minor, interstate shipment of the films
would be unlawful-two months later he eventually agreed to ship the
tapes to Hawaii.99
The initial sale of a box of forty-nine tapes directly to the police
officer formed the basis for the charge that Gottesman had distrib-
uted child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (a) (2).100 The
second sale of a box of eight tapes sold to the police officer and sent
to Hawaii formed the basis of the charge that Gottesman shipped
child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (a) (1).1o1
A federal grand jury indicted Gottesman for distributing, ship-
ping, and conspiring to distribute and ship child pornography in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C. 2252 §§ (a) (1) and (a) (2),102 along with one count
of conspiracy to do the same under 18 U.S.C. § 371.103 In a bench
California drivers license, a U.S. passport, and a birth certificate giving a date of birth of
November 17, 1962. Id.
90 Petitioner's Brief at 4, X-Citement Video (No. 93-723).
91 United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 982 F.2d 1285, 1286 (9th Cir. 1992).
92 Petitioner's Brief at 4, X-Citement Video (No. 93-723).
93 Id.
94 Id.







102 United States v. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d 1285, 1286 (9th Cir. 1992).
103 See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464, 466 (1994). The indict-
ment also charged six counts of violating federal obscenity statutes and two racketeering
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
trial in the United States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia, Gottesman testified that he knew of the rumors that Lords was
under eighteen when she made the tapes but that he believed she was
over eighteen at that time.10 4 Gottesman knew Lords personally, hav-
ing met with her between forty and fifty times over a three year pe-
riod.105 He testified that he believed she falsely floated the rumor that
she was under eighteen when the tapes were made to drive the tapes
from the market so that a new film she was in the process of making at
that time would be more valuable. 10 6
At the close of the government's case and at the close of all of the
evidence, Gottesman moved for acquittal based on the following argu-
ments: (1) § 2252 is unconstitutional on its face because it does not
require scienter as to minority; (2) the indictment is constitutionally
defective because it does not allege that respondents knew Lords was
under eighteen; (3) the Lords tapes were not "child pornography."
10 7
The district court rejected these arguments.10 8 The court concluded
that § 2252 implies a scienter as to minority requirement and that the
government was required to prove and did prove scienter by showing
that Gottesman knew that the person depicted in the videotapes was
under eighteen years of age. 10 9 The court stated: "It is axiomatic that
to know the nature and character of child pornography, almost by
definition, one must know that it depicts children."" 0 Gottesman was
convicted on all counts brought under § 2252, and the district court
sentenced him to twelve months incarceration and ordered him to
pay a $100,000 fine.'11
After Gottesman filed a notice of appeal, the Ninth Circuit de-
cided United States v. Thomas,1 12 holding that the word "knowingly" in
§ 2252 "does not require that [the defendant] knew that the pornog-
raphy he transported, mailed and received involved a minor. The sec-
tion requires only that [the defendant] knowingly transported and
received the material."'1 13 The Thomas court did not address whether
counts involving the same; Gottesman was acquitted of these charges. Id. at 466 n.1.
104 Respondent's Brief at 4, X-Citement Vueo (No. 93-723).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 5. Lords made about a million dollars from an adult movie she appeared in
shortly after the newspaper articles appeared. Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Petitioner's Brief at 5-6, X-Citement Video (No. 93-723); Respondent's Brief at 5-6, X-
Citement Video (No. 93-723).
110 Id.
111 United States v. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d 1285, 1286 (9th Cir. 1992).
112 893 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 826 (1990).
113 Thomas, 893 F.2d at 1070. See Petitioner's Brief at 6, X-Citement Video (No. 93-723);
Respondent's Brief at 6, X-Citement Video (No. 93-723).
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§ 2252, as so construed, was constitutional.' 14 Gottesman requested
and received a remand to district court for reconsideration in light of
Thomas.'" 5 On remand, Gottesman argued that because Thomas ruled
that § 2252 lacked a requirement that a defendant know that he is
distributing or shipping child pornography, the statute on its face vio-
lates the First and Fifth Amendments."
6
Considering Gottesman's arguments on remand, the district
court modified its earlier conclusion that the government met its bur-
den under § 2252 by showing that Gottesman knew Lords was a minor
when she made the videotapes.'17 It changed its interpretation of the
scienter requirement in the statute, finding that the government met
its burden "when it proved that defendant had knowledge of the
'character and contents' of the material." 118 However, the court did
not retract its earlier finding that Gottesman knew that Traci Lords
was a minor when she made the films. 19
The district court considered the constitutionality of § 2252 and
held that it was constitutional. 120 However, the court apparently did
not believe the statute contained a scienter requirement: the court
stated that "Congress specifically omitted a mens rea requirement for
conviction under the statute in order to establish a per se rule making
it illegal for persons to knowingly transport, ship, receive or distribute
the prohibited material involving sexual exploitation of
minors."121
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Gottesman contended that
§ 2252 is unconstitutional on its face because it does not require scien-
ter.122 In response, the government argued that § 2252 did require
scienter because it required that the defendant have general knowl-
edge as to the nature of the contents of the materials-that they de-
pict child pornography-just as obscenity statutes required the
defendant have knowledge that the materials are obscene.
123
The Ninth Circuit reversed Gottesman's conviction, holding that
§ 2252 is unconstitutional on its face because it does not require scien-
114 Petitioner's Brief at 6, X-Citement Video (No. 93-723).
115 Id.; Respondent's Brief at 6, X-Citement Video (No. 93-723).
116 United States v. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d 1285, 1286 (9th Cir. 1992).
117 Petitioner's Brief at 6, X-Citement Video (No. 93-723).
118 Respondent's Brief at 6, X-Citement Video (No. 93-723).
119 Petitioner's Brief at 7, X-Citement Video (No. 93-723).
120 Id. at 6-7. The court found that § 2252 "does not impermissibly chill the distribution
of constitutionally protected material" and is "sufficiently specific and definite to give fair
notice to potential offenders so as not to be deemed void for vagueness." Id.
121 Respondent's Brief at 6, X-Citement Video (No. 93-723).
122 United States v. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d 1285, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1992).
123 Respondent's Brief at 7, X-Citement Vzdeo (No. 93-723). The government did not ar-
gue that the statute required knowledge as to the age of the minor depicted. Id.
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ter as to minority.1 24 Applying the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Hamling v. United States,' 25 the court determined that at a minimum,
the government must prove the defendant knew one of the perform-
ers depicted was a minor.126 The court also relied on Smith v. Califor-
nia127 and New York v. Ferbet428 to support its position that for a statute
prohibiting the distribution of prohibited materials to be constitu-
tional, it must require the defendant have some knowledge of the con-
tents of the materials.'
29
Although in a previous decision the Ninth Circuit held that the
Constitution did not require knowledge of the minority of the per-
former where the defendant was a producer, s0 it explained that dis-
tributors are in a far different position.' 3' The court reasoned that
producers are in a position to know or learn the ages of their employ-
ees while distributors are not: to hold sellers to the same standard
would require them to learn the ages of actors with whom they have
had no direct contact. 132 This would chill protected speech, violating
the First Amendment. 33 Thus, without a scienter requirement,
§ 2252 was unconstitutional.
The court examined whether it could construe § 2252 to save its
constitutionality. 134 The court determined that in light of Thomas it
could not: Thomas ruled squarely that scienter of the minority of the
performer was not an element of the crime defined by § 2252.135 The
124 X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1287.
125 418 U.S. 87 (1974). In Hamling, the Court held that it is constitutionally sufficient
that the prosecution show a defendant had knowledge of the contents of the materials he
distributed and the nature of those contents. Id. at 123. The Ninth Circuit previously had
applied Hamling in Ripplinger v. Collins, 868 F.2d 1043, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 1989), where it
found a statutory definition unconstitutional on its face because it did not require actual
knowledge of the contents of the pornographic material, indicating that a statute must
require such knowledge in order to pass constitutional muster. X-Citement Vuteo, 982 F.2d at
1290 (citing Ripplinger, 868 F.2d at 1056). See supra note 68.
126 X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1291.
127 361 U.S. 147 (1959). The Court held that the First Amendment prohibits prosecu-
tion of a book distributor for possession of an obscene book unless the distributor knows
the contents of the book. Id. at 154.
128 485 U.S. 747 (1982). The Court held that the defendant in a child pornography case
must have some element of scienter before criminal responsibility can be imposed. Id. at
765. See infra part II.C.
129 X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1290.
130 United States v. United States District Court for the Central District of California,
858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988). See supra note 75.
131 X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1291.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1292.
135 Id. The court found the case at bar distinguishable from United States District Court,
where the court engrafted an affirmative defense on to § 2251(a) in order to save it from
being found unconstitutional; it reasoned that engrafting an element of the crime onto a
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majority held that the statute was unconstitutional and accordingly re-
versed Gottesman's conviction.13 6
Judge Kozinski dissented in part. While he agreed with the major-
ity that a child pornography statute must contain a mens rea require-
ment, he did not agree that Gottesman must have known the videos
he sold depicted pornography: recklessness would have sufficed. 137
Furthermore, he found that under traditional rules of construction,
the court can read a mental state of recklessness into the statute in
order to bring it in line with the Constitution.13 8 Judge Kozinski re-
lied on Osborne v. Ohio'3 9 for support.
140
Additionally, Judge Kozinski rejected the majority's contention
that Thomas decided the issue. He reasoned that Thomas did not con-
sider or exclude the possibility that a lower level of scienter might
apply as a matter of constitutional interpretation: Thomas merely de-
cided that the word "knowingly" in the statute does not apply to the
age of the depicted children.141 Thus, he concluded that because
Thomas could not be read to foreclose the issue, it was the court's duty
to save § 2252 (a) by reading into it a requirement that the defendant
acted recklessly as the age of the minor.142
statute comes much closer to judicial rewriting. Id. Furthermore, the court noted that the
Thomas court was fully aware of United States District Court and its rationale, yet declined to
analogize to United States District Court to find that scienter was an element of the crime in
§ 2252. Id. The court declined to rely, as the government asked, on United States v.
Moncini 882 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1989) which stated that § 2252 required the government to
prove that the'defendant have knowledge of the nature of the contents of the visual depic-
tions and that the depictions were to be transported or shipped but that no more was
required. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1289-90 (citing Moncni, 882 F.2d at 404). The court
reasoned that the statement was dictum and unnecessary to the ruling. Id. at 1290. The
court determined that Thomas, therefore, was the only precedent in the Ninth Circuit
resolving the question of whether § 2252 requires scienter of the minority of the perform-
ers. Id.
136 X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1292.
137 X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1292 (KozinskiJ., dissenting).
138 Id. (Kozinski,J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski noted: "It is inconceivable that given the
choice between no statute at all and a statute that contains a requirement of recklessness,
those involved in passing the child pornography statute would have chosen the former
rather than the latter." Id. at 1297.
139 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
140 X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1292-93 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Osborne upheld an
Ohio statute that outlawed the possession of child pornography where the defendant
either knew the performers were underage or was at least reckless as to that fact, although
the statute itself failed to specify a scienter. 495 U.S. at 114 n.9. Ohio law provided that
recklessness was the appropriate mens rea where a statute neither specified culpability nor
plainly indicated a purpose to impose strict liability. Id. See infra part II.E.
141 X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1295 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 826 (1990).
142 Id. at 1296 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 143 to deter-
mine whether the term "knowingly," as used in § 2252, modifies the
noun phrases which separate criminal from innocent conduct or
whether it modifies only the surrounding verbs.
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 44 the Court
held that the term "knowingly" in § 2252 extends both to the sexually
explicit nature of the materials and to the age of the performers. 145
Justice Rehnquist began his analysis by discussing the anomalies that
would result from the most natural grammatical reading adopted by
the Ninth Circuit. 146 Under such a reading, the word knowingly mod-
ifies only the surrounding verbs-transports, ships, receives, distrib-
utes, or reproduces-and not the minority of the performers, or the
sexually explicit nature of the material, because they are set forth in
independent clauses separated by interruptive punctuation. 147 The
Court explained that certain applications of this reading would pro-
duce absurd results: "For instance, a retail druggist who returns an
uninspected roll of developed film to a customer 'knowingly distrib-
utes' a visual depiction and would be criminally liable if it were later
discovered that the visual depiction contained images of children en-
gaged in sexually explicit conduct .... We do not assume that Con-
gress, in passing laws, intended such results."
148
The Court next used three of its prior decisions to support the
presumption that the scienter requirement should apply broadly to
each of the statutory elements, even where the statute itself does not
contain them. 149 First, in Morissette v. United States'50 the Court con-
143 United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1186 (1994).
144 United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994). Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyerjoined in the opinion. Justice Stevens
filed a concurring opinion in which he argued that under a normal, common sense read-
ing of the statute, "knowingly" modifies each element of the offense contained in the sub-
section, noting that in other cases the court has gone much farther than merely requiring
proof of scienter for each element of the offense. Id. at 472 (Stevens, J., concurring) (cit-
ing Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994) (imposing a scienter requirement on an
offense that never contained one in the first place)).
145 Id. at 472.
146 Id. at 467.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 467-68.
149 Id. at 468-69.
150 342 U.S. 246 (1952). The statute at issue in that case, 18 U.S.C. § 641, read in rele-
vant part "Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use
of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher, money,
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cluded that to be held liable under the statute at issue, the defendant
had to have knowledge as to the criminal element in the statute. ' 51
The Court determined that the word "knowingly" modified the phrase
defining property of the United States-meaning that a defendant
must know that the property at issue belongs to the United States-
despite the fact that its isolated position suggested that it only at-
tached to the verb "converts.' 52 The Court supported its position by
applying the background presumption of evil intent which requires
scienter to impose criminal liability.' 53
Second, in Liparota v. United States54 the Court invoked the back-
ground principle set forth in Morissette to hold that, in a federal statute
prohibiting certain actions with respect to food stamps, "knowingly"
modified not only the verbs immediately adjacent but also the phrase
"in any manner not authorized by [the statute]," which was signifi-
candy removed from the word "knowingly."155
Third, in Staples v. United States'5 6 the Court applied the same
analysis in concluding that-despite the fact that Congress had not
expressly imposed any mens rea requirement in the provision criminal-
izing the possession of a firearm in the absence of proper registra-
tion-to be criminally liable, a defendant must know that his weapon
possessed the automatic firing capability so as to make it a machine
gun requiring proper registration.' 57
Analyzing these decisions, the Court stated that § 2252 is like the
common law offenses found in the three cases.' 58 Common law of-
fenses presume a scienter requirement in the absence of express con-
trary intent.159 Morissette, reinforced by Staples, instructs that a scienter
requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements which
criminalize otherwise innocent conduct. °60 Since non-obscene, sexu-
ally explicit materials involving persons over the age of seventeen are
protected by the First Amendment, one would reasonably expect to be
free from regulation when trafficking in those materials. 16 Thus,
or thing of value of the United States... [s]hall be fined." Id. at 248 n.2.
151 Id. at 270.
152 Id.
155 Id.
154 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
155 Id. at 433.
156 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994).
157 Id. at 1804. See supra note 82.
158 United States v. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. 464, 469 (1995).
159 Id. By contrast, a public welfare offense does not require a scienter requirement
because people "harbor settled expectations" that the offense is "generally subject to strin-
gent regulation." Id. at 468. See infra part II.G.




"knowingly" must apply to the age of the performers, because it is the
crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct.
162
The Court also relied on the legislative history of the statute, find-
ing two aspects most persuasive. First, when Congress amended the
statute in 1984 to broaden the spectrum of prohibited materials from
merely obscene materials to include non-obscene, sexually explicit
materials involving children, it did not express any intent to eliminate
the mens rea requirement that had previously attached to the character
and content of the material through the word "obscene."1 63 Second,
in an exchange during the debate over the Roth amendment' 64 -the
initial version of the provision covering distributors of child pornogra-
phy-Senator Percy inquired if a distributor or seller must have had
knowledge of circumstances which were such that he should have had
actual knowledge to render his actions unlawful. 165 Senator Roth re-
plied that this was correct, adding that "knowingly" insures that only
those deliberately engaged in the marketing of child pornography
would be subject to prosecution. 166 Analyzing this legislative history,
the Court concluded that Congress intended "knowingly" apply to the
requirement that the depiction be of sexually explicit conduct.
167
Although the Court acknowledged that it was less clear from Commit-
tee Reports and floor debates that Congress intended "knowingly" to
extend also to the age of the performers, the Court reasoned that if
"knowingly" applied to the sexually explicit conduct depicted ele-
ment, it was emancipated from merely modifying the verbs and must,
therefore, modify the age of minority element as well.
168
The Court also relied on a canon of statutory construction to sup-
port the reading that the term "knowingly" applies to both ele-
ments. 169 It reasoned that several prior decisions suggest that a statute
entirely lacking a scienter requirement as to the age of the performers
would raise serious constitutional doubts. 170 Therefore, the Court
concluded that it must read the statute to eliminate those doubts as




163 Id. at 470. See infra part II.C.
164 See supra note 22.
165 X-Citement Viueo, 115 S. Ct. at 470-71. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
166 X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 470-71. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
167 Id. at 471.
168 Id. at 471-72.
169 Id. at 472.
170 Id. (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103(1990); New York v. Ferber, 485 U.S. 747
(1982); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); and Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147
(1959)).
171 Id. (citing EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction
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The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded
for further proceedings.'
72
B. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT
In his dissent, Justice Scalia 173 agreed with the Ninth Circuit's in-
terpretation of § 2252 as requiring knowledge of neither the fact that
the visual depiction portrays sexually explicit conduct, nor the fact
that a participant in that Conduct was a minor.174 Justice Scalia rea-
soned that the Ninth Circuit's reading of the statute is the only gram-
matical reading permissible: there is no ambiguity that "knowingly"
applies only to the transportation or shipment of the visual depiction
in interstate or foreign commerce. 175
According to Justice Scalia, none of the decisions cited by the
majority supported the conclusion that the presumption in favor of a
scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements
that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct, even when the plain text
of the statute says otherwise. 176 Furthermore, Justice Scalia found that
the dominant view expressed in the legislative history was that the
term "knowingly" applied to the element of the crime that the depic-
tion be of "sexually explicit conduct," but not to the element that the
depiction "involv[e] the use of a minor engaging" in such conduct. 77
The dissent also rejected the majority's argument that the statute
without a scienter requirement would raise constitutional doubts. Jus-
tice Scalia believes that the statute as written only addresses fully pros-
cribable obscenity, not mere pornography, and therefore should not
need a scienter requirement as to the age of the individual de-
picted.'78 Justice Scalia advocated holding purveyors and receivers of
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988)).
172 Id. The Court remanded to the Ninth Circuit to decide whether the indictment was
fatally defective because it did not contain a scienter requirement on the age of minority.
Id. See United States v. X-Citement Video, 77 F.3d 491 (table), 1996 WL 5314 *1 (9th Cir.
Jan. 5, 1996) (mem.) (determining on remand that the indictment was not fatally
defective).
173 Justice Thomas joined injustice Scalia's dissent.
174 X-Cimment Video, 115 S. Ct. at 473 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175 Id. at 475-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176 Id. at 473 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 474 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 (a) (1) (A) and (a) (2) (A)).
Justice Scalia relies on the Department ofJustice statement that: "[T] he defendant's knowl-
edge of the age of the child is not an element of the offense but.., the bill is not intended
to apply to innocent transportation with no knowledge of the nature or character of the
material involved." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1977)).
178 Id. at 474-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia bases his conclusion on the fact
that "sexually explicit conduct" as defined in the statute does not include mere nudity, but
only conduct that consists of "sexual intercourse ... between persons of the same or oppo-
site sex," "bestiality," "masturbation," "sadistic or masochistic abuse," and "lascivious exhibi-
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this material absolutely liable for supporting the exploitation of mi-
nors, stating that he doubted this would deter any activity the Consti-
tution was designed to protect.179 He expressed his policy concern
that the majority's suggestion that such absolute liability was unconsti-
tutional would hinder the ability of Congress to enact laws providing
greater protection for children against the child pornography
trade.'
80
However, Justice Scalia concluded that he found the statute un-
constitutional since, reading it as it is written to impose liability upon
those. not knowingly dealing in pornography, it establishes a severe
deterrent-not narrowly tailored to its purposes-to constitutionally
protected activities. 181 The dissent opined that, although every rea-
sonable construction must be resorted to to save a statute from uncon-
stitutionality,18 2 there is no reasonable construction of § 2252 other
than the one evident from the plain import of its language.'
8 3
V. ANALYSIS
The majority in X-Citement Video held that the government must
prove that a distributor had knowledge of the sexually explicit nature
of the materials he distributes and the age of the performers to be
liable under § 2252. The dissent disagreed, arguing that the gram-
matical structure of the provision precluded reading the statute to re-
quire scienter. Therefore, the dissent found that the statute was
unconstitutional, as it established a severe deterrent to constitution-
ally protected activities and was not narrowly tailored to its purpose.
The majority's approach, deferring to legislative intent and ca-
nons of construction, was correct. However, the majority's analysis
was flawed. Although the majority correctly found that § 2252 con-
tained a scienter requirement, it assumed that knowledge was the ap-
propriate level of scienter. The majority then employed a textual
approach-the same approach it had previously rejected when con-
fronting the existence of a scienter requirement-to extract meaning
from the statute's grammatical structure. Instead, the majority should
have considered other lower levels of scienter and analyzed the issue
under the rubric of congressional intent. Interpreting the statute to
tion of the genitals or pubic area." Id. at 475 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)).
179 Id. at 475 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Justice Scalia charged the majority with "putting in place a
relatively toothless child-pornography law that Congress did not enact" and "rendering
congressional strengthening of the new law more difficult." Id. at 476.
181 Id. at 475 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 476 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
183 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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require recklessness, rather than knowledge, would have more closely
addressed the dual congressional concerns of curbing the distribution
of child pornography and adhering to the confines of the First
Amendment.
A. APPROACHES TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The Court has never adopted a clear rule which could guide stat-
utory interpretation with regards to mental culpability. 184 Scholars
have suggested several possible models of statutory interpretation: 1
85
(1) an adverb of mental culpability modifies only the first immediate
verb following the adverb and says nothing about the noun part of the
statute; (2) an adverb of mental culpability modifies all verbs but says
nothing about the noun parts of the statute; 8 6 (3) an adverb modifies
all critical parts of the statute, at least unless a contrary legislative pur-
pose is clear from the wording of the statute; 87 (4) an adverb modi-
fies all "material elements" of the statute, unless a contrary legislative
purpose is clear from the wording of the statute or from the legislative
history.188
B. JUSTICE SCALIA'S APPROACH WAS WRONG
Justice Scalia followed the second approach. He reasoned that
under the only grammatically correct reading of the statute, "know-
ingly" only modified the verbs in the statute. 8 9 This approach focuses
solely on the plain meaning of the text of the statute. Applying this
method of interpretation, he read § 2252 as unconstitutional because,
without a scienter requirement, it imposed liability on those not know-
ingly dealing in child pornography.
184 Richard G. Singer, Porn Case Highlights Statutory Interpretation, NEwJE:RsEy L. J., Oct.
17, 1994, at 10 (1994).
185 Id.
186 This the result of Justice Scalia's approach.
187 This proposal is the approach taken by the Model Penal Code in Section 2.02 which
requires that the mental culpability portion of the statute apply to every important element
of the offense. The rule requires Congress to do its job-speaking clearly and unequivo-
cally as to its intent in criminal statutes-and only allows courts to result to legislative
history where the legislature has been insufficiently clear. Singer, supra note 184.
The majority basically used this model; finding no contrary legislative purpose clear
from the wording of the statute, it applied "knowingly" to all elements.
188 This Note argues that the majority should have invoked the idea of the fourth model
instead. It should have looked to the legislative history to determine if it should extend the
adverb "knowingly" to each element of the statute.
189 United States v. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. 466, 473-74 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). See infra part IV.B.
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1. Pure Linguistic Analysis Supports Scalia's Approach
Justice Scalia would have the legal issue turn on the linguistic
question of whether, according to ordinary English syntax, the adverb
"knowingly" could be said to modify the clauses requiring the depic-
tion involve the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct
which follow the word "if."'190 Thus, under Justice Scalia's approach,
the linguistic question determines the legal issue.
Justice Scalia's approach is supported by linguists. 91 Linguists
adhere to grammatical rules which account for linguistic phenome-
nons within the context of a complete theory of grammar.192 Apply-
ing a linguistic approach, § 2252 can be edited to reveal its structure
as follows: "Any person who knowingly distributes a depiction if pro-
ducing the depiction involves use of a minor engaging in sexually ex-
plicit conduct shall be punished." 193 Because of the way modification
operates, "knowingly" modifies only the verb "distributes" and cannot
apply to the meaning of the "if' clause.'
9 4
Under a linguistic analysis, basic principles of communication
also warrant a finding that knowledge of the minority status of the
performer is not required under § 2252. Linguists reason that Con-
gress could have written the statute to state a knowledge requirement
in relation to all the elements of the actus reus, because it did not,
basic principles of communication indicate that Congress did not in-
tend to require knowledge of all the elements. 195
190 Michael S. Moore, Plain Meaning and Linguistics - A Case Study, 73 WASH. U. L. Q.
1253, 1254 (1995).
191 Linguistics experts voiced their position in an amicus brief filed by the Law and
Linguistics Consortium: "[Wie care deeply about adverbial syntax, and about what other
courts have said and what this Court may say about syntax in the course of reaching and
explaining its decision here. As experts, we seek to address the theory of interpreting
statutory language that the Court will employ and articulate in this case. On arguments
concerning what knowingly means here, insofar as they are about ordinary language and
syntax, we can speak better than anyone else." Marc R. Poirier, On Wlose Authority?: Lin-
guists' Claim of Expertise to Interpret Statutes, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1025, 1026 (1995) (citing
Brief for Amicus Curiae of the Law and Linguistics Consortium in Support of Respondents,
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994) (No. 93-273)).
Several articles have considered a linguistic analysis of § 2252 and the X-Citement Vueo
decision. See Craig Hoffinan, When Worldviews Collide: Linguistic Theory Meets Legal Semantics
in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1215 (1995);Jefferey P. Kaplan &
Georgia M. Green, Grammar and Inferences of Rationality in Interpreting the Child Pornography
Statute, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1223 (1995); Moore, supra note 190; Marc R. Poirier, On Whose
Authority?: Linguists' Claim of Expertise to Interpret Statutes, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1025 (1995);
Lawrence M. Solan, Judicial Decisions and Linguistic Analysis: Is There a Linguist in the Court,
73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1069 (1995).
192 Hoffman, supra note 191, at 1221.
193 Kaplan & Green, supra note 191, at 1233.
194 Id. at 1235.
195 Id. at 1249.
1368 [Vol. 86
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Policy considerations also concern linguists when courts deviate
from strictly grammatical statutory interpretation. They maintain
that when courts take advantage of inelegant language to write opin-
ions which, on analysis, are not in keeping with the language at all,
this faulty linguistic analysis leads to a confusing jurisprudence which
is only propagated by virtue of stare decisis.'
9 6
2. Courts Should Not Apply Pure Linguistic Analysis in
Interpreting Statutes
Despite support from the linguistic discipline, courts should not
as a rule apply a pure grammatical approach when attempting to di-
vine the meaning of a problematic statute. Putting blinders on to
every influence but grammar compromises the interests of justice.
One cannot analyze the meaning of language independently of views
about the facts such language could be about.'9 7 Semantics is only
one ingredient in the theory of statutory interpretation. 198 Instead of
being limited by the forces driving linguists, judges should also make
use of their moral knowledge in interpreting statutes, asking whether
the standard English meaning of some statutory sentence is too unjust
to be countenanced.199
Instead of allowing objective syntactic analysis to trump legal
principles, one more appropriate alternative would allow the two to
work together to form an integrated interpretation of the statute.200
This approach would begin with an objective syntactic analysis of the
statute and then assign an interpretation to it by applying semantic
elements.20' By analyzing a statute in this way, meaning, derived from
the syntactic structure, and interpretation, derived from contextual in-
formation, would be integrated.20 2 Judges have a responsibility to pay
attention to a broad spectrum of considerations. Justice Scalia's ap-
proach is flawed because it acts as a mere mouthpiece for a linguistic
approach to statutory interpretation rather than taking into account
other important forces that should govern judicial statutory
196 Solan, supra note 191, at 1072.
197 Moore, supra note 190, at 1261-62 (reasoning that a morally desirable reading of
§ 2252 is also a linguistically permissible reading).
198 Linguists care about semantics because the meaning of words and sentences is part
of any plausible theory of how we communicate with one another: Lawyers care about
semantics because the meaning of words and sentences is part of any plausible theory of
how judges should interpret legal texts such as statutes. Moore, supra note 190, at 1253.
199 Moore, supra note 190, at 1261-62.
200 Hoffman, supra note 191, at 1218-20.






C. THE MAJORITY'S FINDING THAT § 2252 REQUIRED SCIENTER WAS
CORRECT
The majority was correct in determining that generally, a statute
governing distributors of child pornography required some level of
scienter because: (1) imposing strict liability would chill protected
speech; and (2) precedent requires scienter. The majority was also
correct to find that, specifically, § 2252 contained a scienter require-
ment because: (1) the avoidance doctrine supports a scienter require-
ment; and (2) legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended
a scienter requirement.
1. The Majority Was Correct in Finding that the Statute
Necessitated Scienter
a. Imposing strict liability would chill protected speech
The majority was correct to conclude that the provision gov-
erning distributors of pornography required scienter as to the age of
the minority. The First Amendment does not permit Congress to im-
pose onerous criminal sanctions on the basis of strict liability where
doing so would chill protected speech.20 3 Imposing a strict liability
standard would effectively require pornography distributors to ex-
amine every book and videotape to determine if the materials possibly
contained images of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
20 4
This would chill protected pornography because purveyors would only
sell those materials that they had inspected, regardless of whether the
uninspected materials were devoid of child pornography.
20 5
Furthermore, under a strict liability standard, distributors could
even be at risk for those materials they examined and thought did not
portray minors. Unlike producers who arrange for minors to appear
in sexually explicit materials, distributors merely handle the images of
the individuals involved; it is not possible to view such media and be
absolutely sure that an actress or actor who is youthful in appearance
is not a minor.20 6 Thus, a strict liability standard would require dis-
tributors to learn not only the content of the materials they carry, but
the ages of every performer in those materials. 20 7 This would imper-
203 Martin, supra note 16. See infra part IIA
204 Timothy W. Mungovan, Comment, Constitutional Law - Protection of Children Against
Sexual Exploitation Act Chills Constitutionally Protected Speech - United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc., 982 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1992), 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 221, 228 (1993).
205 Id.
206 Martin, supra note 16.
207 Id. If strict liability were imposed, the only conceivable protection for a distributor
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missibly chill speech protected by the First Amendment. Imposition
of a scienter requirement was therefore correct.
b. Precedent requires scienter in regulating distributors of
pornography
Under certain circumstances, the Court can uphold a statute as
constitutional even though it does not.contain a scienter requirement.
However, the Court's history of determining when such circumstances
exist demonstrates that no clear rule emerges regarding when it will
find that a statute requires scienter.208 -Public welfare (or regulatory)
offenses, those regulating potentially harmful or injurious items, do
not require the government to prove scienter.20 9 These statutes are
constitutional even where they do not contain a scienter element.
Common law crimes, by contrast, require proof of the defendant's
mens rea.2 10 Thus, the type of crime should determine the interpretive
rule that the Court will apply.211 But, as case law demonstrates, the
dichotomy between the common law and regulatory offenses is rather
amorphous.212 The majority found that the statute required (and
contained) a scienter element, implicitly determining that the offense
was a common law crime. Yet, given the absence of a clear interpre-
tive rule, one might just as easily assume that the overwhelming safety
issue inherent in protecting minors could classify the transportation
of child pornography within the realm of public welfare offenses, re-
quiring no scienter element.213
However, precedent evaluating statutes covering pornography
would be aL contract with the producer requiring him to attach copies of birth certificates
to all materials or otherwise guarantee the age of participants. Strang, supra note 14, at
1801 n.165. However, this would still force the distributor to entrust her criminal liability
to the producers honesty and diligence-little comfort to a distributor facing imprison-
ment. Id.
208 Daniel S. Jonas, The Circuit Split Over Instructing the Juy Specifically On the Good Faith
Defense: A Consequence of Superlegislation by Courts or the Standards of Appellate Review?, 46 SYRA-
CUSE L. REv. 61, 69 (1995).
209 Id. at 70. See infra part II.G.
210 Id. (noting the landmark case Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952)).
211 Id. at 69.
212 Id. at 72. The Court has concluded that the possession of an automatic rifle is a
common law offense requiring knowledge; it analogized that offense to the unauthorized
use of food stamps, requiring knowledge that the defendant knew his conduct was illegal,
and distinguished it from the possession of unregistered hand grenades, an offense con-
taining no knowledge requirement. Id. (citing Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793,
1799-1800, 1804 (1994)). See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985); United States
v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971). The Court seems to be creating distinctions where none
exist.
213 Id. at 73. Scalia suggests as much, stating that he believes distributors could be held




distributors supports the majority's conclusion that scienter is re-
quired.214 The Court has previously held: that obscenity laws gov-
erning distributors must contain a scienter requirement;215 that the
government must prove that distributors of obscenity had knowledge
of the contents of the materials; 216 and that recklessness would be a
sufficient level of scienter for possession of child pornography.
217
These cases demonstrate that the Court has repeatedly taken the posi-
tion that a pornography distributor must have some level of awareness
of the contents he is distributing in order to be held liable.218 Thus,
the Court was correct to find that § 2252 required scienter to be
constitutional.
2. The Majority Was Correct to Find that § 2252 Contained a
Scienter Element
a. The avoidance canon supports finding a scienter requirement
General avoidance doctrine supports the majority's interpreta-
tion of § 2252 as requiring scienter. The avoidance canon requires
courts to uphold a statute whenever a constitutional construction is
possible: "When the validity of an act of Congress is drawn in question,
and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of
the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided."21 9
The primary justifications for the rule are: to prevent absurd results;
to promote legislative efficiency; and to facilitate judicial deference to
legislative intent.220 In its narrowest form the avoidance canon is used
214 See infra part II.E.
215 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
216 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
217 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
218 However, some scholars believe that courts should not rely on obscenity decisions
when analyzing child pornography cases because the state interests at stake with child por-
nography-protection of children from extreme emotional harm-are more substantial
that those at stake with obscenity regulation. See Fuhrman, supra note 10, at 96; Strang,
supra note 14, at 1798. Child pornography laws differ from obscenity laws in that they
address a particularized harm to the children involved in the production. Id. Thus, a
scienter requirement is less compelling for child pornography statutes. Id.
219 Child Pornography-Statutory Interpretation, 109 HARv. L. REv. 279, 285 (1995) (quoting
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936)).
220 Id. See also Public Citizen v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989)
("We are loath to conclude that Congress intended to press ahead into dangerous constitu-
tional thickets in the absence of firm evidence that it courted those perils"); Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988) (Unless there is evidence of a contrary meaning, the Court will assume
that Congress drafted a statute within the boundaries of the Constitution: "Where an
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems,
the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is
plainly contrary to the intent of Congress"). But see Child Pornography, supra note 219, at 286
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to correct a "scrivener's error"-a drafting error that produces an ab-
surd result when the true meaning of the statute is absolutely clear.
221
A more liberal application dictates that when the plain meaning of
the statute is unreasonable, courts should look to the legislative his-
tory to determine whether the meaning comports with the drafters
intent.
222
When read literally, § 2252 renders distributors liable merely be-
cause they knew that they were transporting materials, without requir-
ing knowledge as to what the materials were. This plain meaning is
unreasonable. Thus, under a liberal interpretation of the avoidance
canon, the majority was correct to turn to the legislative history to
determine Congress' intent.223 Since the majority determined that
Congress intended the statute to require scienter, it was correct to
read the statute accordingly.
b. Legislative history supports a scienter requirement
A review of the legislative history demonstrates that Congress in-
tended the statute to require some level of scienter.224 Discussion be-
n.1336 (citing Lawrence C. Marshall, Divesting the Courts: Breaking the Judicial Monopoly on
Constitutional Interpretation, 66 CHI.-KENT L. Rav. 481 488 (1990)) (reasoning that because
courts are often hesitant to assume that Congress intended to pass an unconstitutional
statute, they ignore the fact that Congress usually does not consider a statute's constitu-
tional ramifications)).
221 Child Pornography, supra note 219, at 285.
222 Id. at 286. There are several notable criticisms of this application of the canon. First,
committee reports, committee hearings, floor debates, and statements by sponsors or draft-
ers of legislation are all subject to the influence of artful lobbying. Id. at 286 n.1339. Sec-
ond, the liberal application is problematic when there is ambiguity as to Congressional
intent because this leads to more than one interpretation. Id. at 286.
Some scholars urge only selectively applying legislative history to unreasonable inter-
pretations, using it only when two competing constructions are of relatively equal plausibil-
ity or when there is actual evidence that Congress thought about the constitutional
difficulty and tried to avoid it. Id. (citing Marshall, supra note 220; at 491-92). A slightly
different approach would allow the Court to allow departure from the plain meaning of
the statutory language upon "only the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions"
in the legislative history. Id. at 287 (citing United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680
(1985)).
223 However, scholars caution that several far reaching problems can arise when courts
turning to legislative history to rescue a statute whose plain meaning is unconstitutional:
(1) it encourages lower courts to adopt their own interpretations under these same circum-
stances which undermines legislative supremacy; (2) Congress does not always approve of
the Court's reinterpretation and might in some circumstances prefer invalidation over ju-
dicial interpretation; (3) judicial bending essentially creates a judge-made constitutional
penumbra because of Congress' general inability or unwillingness to reject a judicial mis-
construction of one of its statutes; (4) saving statutes in this way discourages Congress from
taking care in drafting its statutes; and (5) upholding dubious statutes precludes Congress
from facing constitutional issues and rewriting statutes in a2 way that clearly expresses its
own view of the Constitution. Id. at 287-89.
224 See infra part I.B.
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tween Senators Roth and Percy demonstrates that, in drafting the
provision applying to distributors of child pornography, Senator Roth
intended to only hold those distributors liable who knew that the
materials they were distributing portrayed children engaged in sexu-
ally explicit conduct.22 5 Discussion in the House addressed concerns
over the scienter required under the Roth amendment. House mem-
bers supporting the bill explicitly stated that the bill was intended to
cover only those distributors aware that the materials were child por-
nography, resolving any constitutional concerns on that point.
2 2 6
Furthermore, the Department of Justice did not voice any First
Amendment concerns regarding scienter. The only constitutional
concern addressed by the Department in its review of the language of
the Roth amendment pertained to the lack of an obscenity require-
ment.227 In fact, the Department stated that it believed retention of
the word "knowingly" in the provision regulating distributors was
proper to make it clear that the bill did not apply merely to common
carriers.22
8
Additionally, when the Committee on the Judiciary for the Senate
considered the use of the word "knowingly" in the provision gov-
erning producers, it stated that the word was intended to require the
producers to know the purpose for which the minors involved were
being used.2 29 The Committee on the Judiciary for the House of Rep-
resentatives emphasized this point when, in addressing the removal of
the word from the provision covering producers, it stated that the gov-
ernment was no longer required to prove the defendant's knowledge
of everything following the word knowinglye-including the age of the
child.2 0 Both of these analyses indicate that, by retaining the word
"knowingly" in § 2252, Congress must have known that it would re-
quire the government to prove scienter as to everything following the
word "knowingly"-including the age of the child.
In its report accompanying the final draft of § 2252, the Confer-
ence Committee gave no explanation for why it rearranged the struc-
ture of the provision covering distributors from the original language
of the Roth amendment.2 31 This demonstrates that by rearranging
the provision, Congress did not deliberately eliminate the scienter re-
225 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
226 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
227 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
228 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. However, the Department also stated that
the legislative history should clarify that the defendant's knowledge of the age of the child
is not an element of the offense. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
229 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
230 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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quirement-which was clearly intended to apply in the Roth amend-
ment. The only discussion regarding the word "knowingly"
concerned the provision covering producers, stating that it eliminated
the word because the government need not prove the defendant knew
the age of the child.2 3 2 This further supports the position that Con-
gress knew how to eliminate a scienter requirement when it did not
intend to include mens rea-and knew how to preserve it when it did.
Finally, the absence of any discussion surrounding the scienter
requirement, or lack thereof, in the legislative history accompanying
the 1984 and 1986 amendments also indicates that Congress was not
concerned with any constitutional problems regarding scienter. The
only constitutional issue raised during the redrafting of § 2252 in the
1984 amendments pertained to the striking of the obscenity require-
ment.2 33 In 1986, when Congress added a provision covering the pro-
duction of advertisements, it placed the word "knowingly" in the exact
position as in § 2252.234 Congress explained that under the new pro-
vision, the government must show that the defendant knew the mater-
ials depicted minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct.23 5
Congress clearly intended that provision to require scienter; since that
provision mirrored § 2252, the same scienter rationale should apply.
Thus, the majority correctly concluded that the legislative history
demonstrates that Congress drafted the statute intending to include a
scienter requirement.23
6
D. THE MAJORITY'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES TO
KNOWLEDGE WAS WRONG
In determining what level of scienter to apply, the majority basi-
cally followed the third approach to statutory interpretation, assuming
that based on the language of the statute "knowingly" modified all
material elements. Like Justice Scalia, the majority, in determining
232 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
233 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
234 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
235 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
236 Justice Scalia found to the contrary. Scalia opined that the legislative history demon-
strated that, at best, Congress intended "knowingly" apply only to the fact that the material
involves sexually explicit conduct, but not to the fact that it involves the use of a minor
engaging in that conduct. United States v. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. 464, 474 (1995)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
Likewise, commentators have also interpreted the legislative history as demonstrating
that Congress did not intend to include a scienter requirement. One scholar reasoned
that since Congress seemed aware of the scienter question while drafting the statute, it
would have included a scienter requirement had it intended there to be one and that its
failure to consider the constitutional implications of not including one does notjustify the
majority's imposition of scienter on the statute. Child Pornography, supra note 219, at 286.
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the level of scienter, focused narrowly on the pure text of the statute.
This approach was wrong for the same reasons as Justice Scalia's ap-
proach: in assuming that knowledge was the correct level of scienter
based on the presence of the word "knowingly" in the statute, the
Court failed to acknowledge other considerations, the most important
of which is Congressional intent.
1. The Court's Analysis Invoking a Scienter Level of Knowledge
Was Flawed
After determining that § 2252 required scienter, the majority
concluded that, although due to its isolated position "knowingly" ap-
peared to modify only the verbs in the statute, it in fact applied to
each element, including the age of the minority.23 7 The majority's
analysis is flawed. While the decision carefully explained its reasons
for interpreting § 2252 as requiring scienter,238 it gave no basis for
imposing knowledge as the appropriate level of mens rea.
The Court appears to have reasoned that since "knowingly" was
the word used in the statute, the defendant was therefore required to
have knowledge as to the age of the minority.239 The Court should not
have leapt to this conclusion. None of the three main bases relied on
by the majority in reaching its decision mandate applying knowledge
as the requisite level of scienter. First, the Court relied on precedent
in applying statutory interpretation. While precedent has extended
the word "knowingly" from modifying only the verbs in the statute to
require knowledge as to the other elements of an offense, the rule
which can be drawn from the line of cases relied on by the majority is
not so narrow. Read broadly, the rule instructs courts to apply scien-
ter to each statutory element which criminalize otherwise innocent
conduct; it does not speak to the specific mens rea level.2 40 Second,
237 X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct at 469-72. Having decided that, based on the legislative
history, "knowingly" should apply to the requirement that the depiction be of sexually
explicit conduct, the Court reasoned that "knowingly" was emancipated from merely modi-
fyring the verbs and could apply to the age of minority element as well. Id. at 471-72.
238 See infra parts IV.A. and V.A.
239 This creates a somewhat perverted result when compared to cases delineating the
appropriate level of scienter for obscenity distributors. In Hamling v. United States, the
Court stated that a defendant would be held liable if he had knowledge of the nature of
the obscene materials he distributed. 418 U.S. 87, 123 (1974). Requiring child pornogra-
phy distributors to have knowledge not only of the nature of the materials but the age of
the performers involved, provides greater protection to child pornography distributors
than to obscenity distributors. See Mungovan, supra note 204, at 229.
240 See infra part IVA The Court relied on Morissette v. United States and Liparota v.
United States which both extended the word "knowingly," modifying only the verbs in the
statute, to apply to the element separating criminal from innocent conduct. However, the
Court also relied on Staples v. United States where the Court employed knowledge as the
appropriate level of scienter despite the fact that the statute did not include any words
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the Court relied on legislative history. Taken as a whole, the legisla-
tive history does not demonstrate specifically that Congress intended
that the defendant have knowledge; rather it demonstrates generally
that Congress intended a scienter element to apply.2 4 ' Furthermore,
Congress' elimination of the obscenity requirement in the 1984 Act
following the New York v. Ferber decision demonstrates that Congress
intended to prohibit child pornography distribution to the fullest ex-
tent permitted under the Constitution. A scienter level of knowledge
falls short of this goal. Third, the Court relied on canons of statutory
construction. The avoidance canon instructs courts to employ a con-
stitutional interpretation where possible; employing a level of scienter
other than knowledge would still satisfy this purpose.
Although nothing precluded the Court from applying knowledge
as the appropriate level of mens rea, neither was the Court prohibited
from considering other alternatives. After previously rejecting a
purely grammatical approach to give credence to congressional intent
and read in a scienter requirement, the Court should not have then
flip flopped, disregarding intent in favor of applying grammatical
maxims.
2. The Court Should Have Considered Alternatives to Knowledge
The modem interpretation of criminal statutes involves an ele-
ment by element analysis recognizing that different states of mind
may apply to different elements of the crime.2 42 The elements of a
statute can be separated into three classes: conduct; surrounding cir-
cumstances; and prohibited result.2 43 If an element is classified as
conduct, only the mental state of knowledge may apply.244 However,
if an element is classified as a surrounding circumstance or a prohib-
ited result, any level of mens rea may apply.2 45 The surrounding cir-
cumstance in § 2252 is the fact that the material is child
pornography.
2 46
A determination of which level of mens rea to apply should involve
indicating mens rea Thus, the general rule of these cases does not direct the Court to apply
whatever level of scienter is present elsewhere in the statute; rather, the rule instructs the
Court to presume a scienter requirement in the absence of contrary congressional intent.
241 However, Senator Roth, stating that he only intended those deliberately engaged in
the distribution of child pornography to be subject to prosecution, clearly intended knowl-
edge to be the requisite level. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. But see Fuhrman,
supra note 10, at 97 (reasoning that there was clear legislative intent to exclude knowledge





246 Id. at 97-98.
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balancing First Amendment rights with the importance of protecting
the victims of child pornography.247 A knowledge standard places too
high of a burden on the government and is not necessary under First
Amendment doctrine.2 4 Given the gravity of harm to the children
involved, the Court should have at least considered alternatives to
knowledge that would have provided greater protection to the child
victims.
2 4 9
a. An alternative to mens rea: mistake of age defense
250
With a mistake of age defense, mens rea is still a factor in deter-
mining whether the statute has been violated, but the burden of proof
is on the defendant.2 51 Application of this defense is not difficult; age
is an objectively verifiable fact.2 52 This defense permits a defendant to
prevail if he could prove that he honestly and reasonably believed that
none of the videotapes he distributed contained child
pornography.
253
247 Id. at 98. Studies have shown that sexually exploited children have difficulty develop-
ing healthy, affectionate relationships later in life and have a tendency to become sexual
abusers as adults. Id. (citing Ulrich C. Schoettle, M.D., Child Exploitation: A Study of Child
Pornography, 19J. Am. AcAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 289, 296 (1980)).
248 Robert F. Schwartz, Recent Development: Federal Child Pornography Law's Scienter Require-
ment - United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 28 HA-RV. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 585, 598 (1993).
Under a knowledge standard, a pornography distributor is free to sell or rent a performer's
films even after leaning through a series of news stories that the performer was probably
underage when she made the films and that an investigation was underway. Id. Thousands
of copies of that tape might be purchased by collectors of material featuring underage
performers in the meantime. Id. A distributor would not be liable until the performer's
age had been established beyond dispute. Id.
249 A contrary view reasons that the rule of lenity requires courts to construe the statute
as containing the highest degree of scienter that is not beyond the ambiguity inherent in
the statute and that does not defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. Id. at 596-97.
Another view takes the position that mens rea for some elements will be presumed to apply
to every element of the offense unless a clear legislative intent to the contrary exists. Fuhr-
man, supra note 10, at 97.
250 In his dissent in the Ninth Circuit opinion in X-Citement Video, Judge Kozinski
pointed out that engrafting a mistake of age defense onto a statute is something "far more
exotic" than merely reading in a scienter requirement. United States v. X-Citement Video,
982 F.2d 1285, 1296 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
251 Fuhrman, supra note 10, at 99. Under this defense, the trier of fact should deter-
mine whether a reasonable distributor would have known or should have investigated
whether the sexually explicit material he was selling depicted a minor. Strang, supra note
14, at 1802.
252 Id. at 1797. However, a mistake of criminality, where a defendant argues that she was
under a mistaken belief about what was considered illegal, is not a defense. Id.
253 Fuhrman, supra note 10, at 99. The Ninth Circuit employed a mistake of age defense
in a case involving § 2251, the provision governing producers. United States v. United
States District Court for the Central District of California, 858 F.2d 534, 542 (9th Cir 1988)
(finding the statute unconstitutional because it lacked a scienter requirement but saving it
by invoking a mistake of age defense). However, producers are in a much better position
than distributors to know and have control over who is portrayed in their video, making it
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Some believe that this defense strikes the appropriate balance of
providing First Amendment protection for innocent distributors with-
out going unnecessarily beyond the constitutional minimum.2 54 The
mistake of age defense would encourage the diligence of distributors,
as opposed to knowledge, which encourages ignorance.2 55 Engrafting
a mistake of age defense onto the statute instead of requiring scienter
runs the risk of causing a chilling effect because it would require af-
firmative action by the distributor to at least attempt to ascertain all of
the ages of every performer involved in the entire stock of materials
distributed.
b. Negligence
A criminal negligence standard shifts the risk to those engaging
in the activity and punishes those who act carelessly by applying a rea-
sonable person test.2 56 Negligence is not a state of mind; it is a stan-
dard of conduct a defendant is expected to maintain regardless of his
state of mind.2 57 Under a negligence standard, a defendant will be
found liable if his lack of awareness falls below that of a reasonable
person.2 58 A negligence standard might also place too great a burden
on a defendant, running the risk of a chilling effect, because the ap-
plicable reasonable man standard might require a distributor to try to
ascertain all of the ages of the performers depicted in the videos.
c. Recklessness
The alternative scienter level closest to knowledge is reckless-
ness.2 59 Under a recklessness standard, a distributor would be liable
if he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a
fair to place the burden on the defendant. Fuhrman, supra note 10, at 100.
254 Strang, supra note 14, at 1802.
255 Id. at 1801-02. Some argue that it is unfair, however to place this heavy burden of
proof on the defendant, who, although innocent, may not be able to meet the onerous
evidentiary requirements. Additionally, to relieve the government from having to prove all
of the elements of the offense would in theory violate the presumption of a defendant's
innocence. Fuhrman, supra note 10, at 100-01.
256 Id. at 98.
257 Id. at 98-99.
258 Id.
259 Judge Kozinski suggested that recklessness was the proper level of scienter in his
dissent in X-Citement Vtideo. See United States v. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d 1285, 1292-97
(9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski,J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski believed that the traditional rules
of construction supported reading in a recklessness requirement in order to bring it in line
with the Constitution. Id. at 1297. He believed that Congress deleted a knowledge require-
ment in drafting the statute but did not read this to preclude all scienter requirements. Id.
Judge Kozinski relied heavily on congressional intent, reasoning that Congress would have
preferred to pass § 2252 with a recklessness requirement than not pass it at all. Id. at 1296.
See infra part III.
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performer in a film he distributed was a minor.260 This would require
distributors to take reasonable precautions if they became aware of a
substantial risk that a particular performer was a minor or that a par-
ticular film or publication contained minors.261
Supreme Court precedent supports invoking recklessness as the
appropriate level of scienter. The Court implicitly approved a reck-
lessness standard in Osborne v. Ohio, holding that it was a constitution-
ally permissible standard in state criminal laws prohibiting possession
of child pornography.2 62 Osborne is distinguishable in that it addresses
possession, not distribution; yet, the distinction would, if anything,
favor granting greater protection to the private possession of, versus
the interstate distribution of, such materials.2 63 Under this analysis of
Osborne, recklessness would be a constitutionally acceptable level of sci-
enter to impose on distributors.2 64 However, complete reliance on
Osborne is notjustified. Osborne cannot be applied as precedent for the
proposition that recklessness is the appropriate scienter standard for
statutes regulating child pornography distributors. The constitutional
challenge addressed in that case was that the statute at issue contained
no scienter level at all, not that recklessness was a constitutionally defi-
cient standard.2
65
On balance however, Osborne does help bolster the position that
recklessness would suffice as a viable level of scienter for the regula-
tion of child pornography distributors. From a policy standpoint, a
recklessness standard would best accomplish Congress' goal of deter-
ring the distribution of child pornography without impermissibly chil-
ling pornography involving adults. It would place the burden on the
distributor to be aware of the materials he distributes and attuned to
any rumors that performers involved are minors. A recklessness stan-
dard would not require distributors to take the exorbitant measures
required by the alternative standards. But neither would it allow dis-
tributors the freedom to close their eyes and ears to information that
minors are being sexually exploited in materials they are distributing.
Thus, a recklessness standard best satisfies the goal of attacking child
pornography to the fullest extent without treading on First Amend-
ment boundaries.
260 Schwartz, supra note 248, at 598-99.
261 Id.
262 495 U.S. 103. See infra part II.E.
263 Fuhrman, supra note 10, at 95.
264 Additionally, the Court has held that recklessness was a constitutionally sufficient
mens rea in libel cases, a context much closer to the heart of the First Amendment than
pornography. Schwartz, supra note 248, at 599 (citing NewYork Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 279-80 (1964)).




The Court's decision in United States v. X-Citement Video26 6 held
that the word "knowingly" in § 2252 extends both to the sexually ex-
plicit nature of the materials and to the age of the performers. Look-
ing beyond a mere grammatical 'reading of the statute, the Court
applied other considerations to read in a scienter requirement and
uphold the statute as constitutional. In contrast, the dissent's inter-
pretation of the word "knowingly" looked only to the plain meaning
of the text. It found thit under the sole permissible grammatical
reading of the statute, "knowingly" applied only to the verbs and not
to any of the noun phrases separating innocent from criminal
conduct.
While a linguistic analysis would support Justice Scalia's reason-
ing, a purely textual approach to statutory interpretation is wrong.
Rather than limiting interpretation to what is said on the face of a
statute, judges should incorporate other considerations, such as legis-
lative intent, in attempting to ascertain meaning. Faced with a statute
whose plain meaning would lead to absurd results, the majority cor-
rectly looked to congressional intent. Based on that intent, among
other considerations, it found that § 2252 required scienter and up-
held the statute.
However, the majority incorrectly assumed that the level of scien-
ter required under the statute was knowledge. The Court failed to
even consider lower levels of scienter, and instead extended the word
"knowingly," which modified only the verbs, to apply to the noun
phrases as well. The majority had already discarded a strict grammati-
cal interpretation in favor of considering congressional intent. Hav-
ing determined that the statute did not say what Congress intended it
to say, the majority should not have returned to a textual approach
and attempted to extract meaning from the statute's grammatical
structure. The Court should have considered other alternatives to a
knowledge standard and analyzed the question of scienter level within
the framework of congressional intent. A recklessness standard would
have most appropriately integrated Congress' goals of regulating the
distribution of child pornography to the fullest extent possible while
remaining abreast of the limits of the First Amendment.
By upholding the statute as constitutional, the Court did not give
Congress an open door-as striking it down would have done-to re-
draft § 2252 and clarify its meaning in the words of the statute. The
Court's imposition of knowledge as the applicable level of scienter
bound the government to meet this stringent standard in prosecuting
266 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994).
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all future convictions. Having determined to approach statutory inter-
pretation from the vantage point of "what Congress intended to say,"
the Court should have continued to adhere to its method and more
carefully considered Congress' intent in determining the applicable
scienter level rather than merely assuming knowledge applied. In-
stead, the Court engrafted a scienter level Congress may not have in-
tended while discouraging Congress from redrafting the legislation.
The majority should have followed its initial approach though the en-
tire analysis. By stopping short, the majority verged on impermissible
judicial legislating. The Court should take heed in the future to con-
sider carefully congressional intent at all levels of its analysis when in-
terpreting a problematic statute.
